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FACING THE FEAR: A FREE MARKET 
APPROACH FOR ECONOMIC EXPRESSION 
 
NANCY J. WHITMORE* 
 
Commentators differ on whether a diminished constitutional status for profit-
driven speech is consistent with free speech theory. Most recently, the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission largely embraced an unfettered marketplace approach for political 
speech financed by corporate treasuries. Given the harm a free market approach is 
said to have produced in the economic realm, is this approach useful for 
structuring the constitutional protection economic expression receives? This 
article discusses the placement of economic expression within First Amendment 
theory and contends that restrictions on economic speech should be aimed at 
combating deceptive economic activities while overall regulatory goals should 
focus on requirements that enrich the supply of accurate and timely information. 
 
For economists, profit motives, greedy intentions and the private 
accumulation of wealth do not in and of themselves establish social harm.1 
Instead, such outcomes of self-interest are widely recognized in economic circles 
as the motivation that stimulates productivity and advances society’s interests.2 
But for many non-economists, overall faith in and appreciation for the merits of a 
self-regulated market approach produces a distasteful even offensive system that 
calls out for self-restraint and government regulation to minimize the social 
harms it produces.3 
                                                
* Associate Professor and Director, Eugene S. Pulliam School of Journalism, Butler 
University.  
1 See BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER 182 (2007); Walter Williams, The 
Virtue of Greed, CAPITALISM MAG., Jan. 5, 2001, available at 
http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=69. 
2 See Jonathan B. Wight, Adam Smith and Greed, 21 J. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 46, 49-50 (2005). 
The idea that profit seeking, in a sense, is good can be traced to Adam Smith in The Wealth of 
Nations (1776). Smith wrote, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interests.” Id. at 49. 
3 See CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 182. 
  
 
The debate surrounding free markets, profit seekers and wealth 
accumulation is not confined to issues of economics. For decades, First 
Amendment commentators have debated the marketplace value of speech 
motivated by profit maximization and the appropriate placement such 
expression should occupy within existing free speech theory. Like many non-
economists, a number of commentators have called for regulation of 
economically driven speech in order to mitigate the corrosive and damaging 
effects economic power can have on expression.4 Regulation of economic 
expression, they argue, is consistent with First Amendment principles given that 
speech motivated by profit maximization is unrelated to the core values of 
individual liberty and self-realization5 and effective self-government.6 These 
speaker-based values, they contend, provide the framework for the constitutional 
protection speech activities receive, but are not implicated in the realm of 
commercial speech,7 where the rights of the receiver are paramount8 and speech 
is valued for the utility it provides to society at large.9 In this speech-based arena, 
regulation is warranted to protect receivers from false information and deceptive 
commercially based speech practices.10 
Other commentators, however, view the lower levels of First Amendment 
protection for speech provoked by monetary rewards and commercial gain as 
inconsistent with the core principles of free speech theory. Those principles, 
                                                
4 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS 1 (2001). 
5 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1976-77). 
6 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due 
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979). 
7 See id. at 6, 14. 
8 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 437, 454 (1980). 
9 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 763-64 (1995). 
10 See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 459. 
  
 
commentators argue, promote the inclusion of ideas and opinions within the 
marketplace and preclude government from discriminating among speech based 
on the perceived economic power of the speaker. A diminished constitutional 
status for profit-driven speech, it is argued, reduces the amount of information in 
the marketplace in order to achieve an economic redistribution among speakers. 
This marketplace redistribution works to favor certain speakers and subtly 
promote the ideological objective of economic redistribution.11  
Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States waded into these 
waters with its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.12 
Reaction to the Court’s decision ran the gamut from praise to contempt. 
President Barack Obama called it a “major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, 
health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their 
power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday 
Americans.”13 Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, on the other hand, 
commended the “important step” the Court took in “restoring the First 
Amendment rights” of corporate interests and profit-motivated speakers.14 “Our 
democracy,” he said, “depends upon free speech, not just for some but for all.”15  
The division Citizens United fostered among elected officials and public 
interest groups mirrors the long-standing debate among commentators 
concerning the marketplace value of corporate and commercial expression and 
                                                
11 See. e.g., REDISH, supra note 4, at 9-10, 149-52. 
12 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
13 Reactions to the Supreme Court Reversing Limits on Corporate Spending in Political 
Campaigns, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/01/reactions-to-the-supreme-court.html.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
  
 
its subsequent place within the theoretical structure of First Amendment law.16 
This debate largely reflects the dominance of the marketplace model in First 
Amendment law17 and the inherent tensions that underlie the reconciliation of a 
model largely rooted in laissez-faire economic theory18 with the multiplicity of 
values and interests at play in a speech market. In Citizens United, the tension 
between a self-regulating, free market approach and a paternalistic regulatory 
practice designed to mitigate the corrosive effects of economic expression came 
to a head. The Court noted the deviation between First Amendment theory and 
regulatory practice in this area of free speech law and made a course correction 
that largely embraced an unfettered marketplace and placed greater reliance on 
the rationality of the voting public and its ability to discern truth from falsehood 
in the short term.19  
By discounting the alleged harms that flow from political speech financed 
by corporate treasuries and interests,20 the Court is fostering a free market system 
for economic expression. In the economic realm, this system has come under 
repeated criticism for the harms it generates. Most recently, the federal 
government enacted a sweeping expansion of federal financial regulation that 
broadened consumer protection in light of the near-collapse of the world 
                                                
16 For those who align constitutional protection for speech solely with the individual 
liberty rights of the speaker, profit-driven speech by institutional speakers lies largely outside of 
the realm of any First Amendment safeguards. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 5, at 3. 
17 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3 (1989); W. Wat 
Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40, 
40 (1996). 
18 See R. H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 385 
(1974). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 240-70.  
20 See infra text accompanying notes 251-65. 
  
 
financial system21 that critics contend was largely caused by a free market 
ideology.22 Given the harms this ideology is said to have produced in the 
economic realm, is a market-based model useful for structuring the constitutional 
protection economic expression receives? To answer this question, this article 
examines the relationship between economic theory and a market-based free 
speech approach for economic expression and concludes that economic 
expression should be fully encompassed within the marketplace structure of the 
First Amendment law and that free speech principles that harness and expedite 
the self-correcting power of the marketplace should drive regulatory regimes 
involving profit-driven speech. 
The analysis upon which this conclusion was reached begins with an 
examination of the rise of the marketplace model as an organizing principle in 
First Amendment jurisprudence and its relationship to the free speech values of 
self-determination and effective self-government.  The article first explores the 
present place economic expression occupies within the theoretical structure of 
the First Amendment and the justifications for government restrictions on 
corporate and commercial speech.  Second, the marketplace model is used to 
explore the association between unfettered speech and economic markets. 
Specifically the section examines the roles individualism, rationality, power and 
harm play in these markets in general and in economic speech markets in 
particular. The article concludes with a discussion on the degree to which 
government regulation of economic expression is warranted and contends that 
                                                
21 See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Updated: Sept. 20, 2011, available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopic/subjects/c/credit_crisis_/financial_reg
ulatory_reform/index.html.   
22 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andres, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?. 
  
 
speech restrictions should be reserved as means to combat deceptive and 
fraudulent economic activities and that overall regulatory goals for economic 
expression should focus on requirements that enrich the supply of accurate, 
reliable and timely information that is available to consumers.   
 
THE RISE OF MARKETPLACE MODEL 
 Commentators and courts have been justifying the constitutional status of 
speech for more than a century. The discussion focuses largely on the values the 
preservation of speech activities foster and the perceived dangers government 
restriction of such activities generate. Although multiple explanations have been 
proffered for the prominent placement expression receives within constitutional 
law, individual fulfillment and realization, effective self-government and the 
marketplace of ideas have emerged as the most frequently cited.23 Each of these 
justifications casts the underlying purpose of the First Amendment in somewhat 
different terms and frames the adjudication of free speech issues in distinct and 
explicit ways. The justification that dominates First Amendment jurisprudence 
organizes the judiciary’s understanding of freedom of speech24 and works to 
shape the constitutional, political and economic landscape in which expression 
exists. It provides the foundation upon which speech-based decisions are built 
and becomes the “background against which every judge writes.”25  
                                                
23 See Matthew Bunker, First Amendment Theory and Conceptions of the Self, 1 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 241, 242 (1996). 
24 Because the First Amendment is written in vague, sweeping language, the adjudication 
of free speech issues requires the judiciary to craft an understanding of freedom of speech, that is, 
what it means, what lies at its core and at its periphery, what is completely outside its protection 
and what is unknown, and where future speech challenges exist, for example. This 
understanding is largely influenced by the theoretical justification(s) the judiciary brings to bear 
on a particular case. 
25 Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1986). 
  
 
Although the First Amendment was added to the Constitution in 1791, the 
modern understanding of free speech law largely emerged in the latter decades 
of the twentieth century and took its shape from an evolving body of case law 
that began in 191926 with Schenck v. United States27 and the question of whether 
the free speech clause provided any protection against criminal sanctions for the 
distribution of anti-draft leaflets. In a unanimous decision written by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction in 
Schenck.28 Eight months later, a similar case produced a dissent by Justice 
Holmes. While the conviction was upheld in Abrams v. United States,29 in his 
dissent Justice Holmes introduced the concept of the marketplace of ideas into 
First Amendment law and used it to affirm free speech protection of wartime 
dissent.30 Since then the concept has become embedded in American 
jurisprudence31 and “rests on the premise that the proper evolution of 
intellectual, political, scientific and philosophical thought can only be achieved if 
the exercise of speech is uninhibited by governmental interference.”32 
 The marketplace concept provides extensive protection for free speech 
activities, and when employed by justices as rationale in majority or plurality 
                                                
26 Most commentators agree that by the 1970s there was uniform acceptance of the 
principle of free speech. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 4-6 
(1995); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285-86 (1983). By the 
early 1970s, case law – including Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969), and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) – laid the groundwork for a 
“profound commitment to virtually unlimited discussion of political, moral, and social questions 
of all types.” Schauer, supra, at 1287. 
27 249 U.S. 47 (1919). According to Steven H. Shiffrin, “[M]ost American law students 
begin their study of the first amendment” with this case. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 72 (1990). 
28 249 U.S. at 52. 
29 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
30 Id. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
31 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 17, at 7; LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 18 (1986); 
Hopkins, supra note 17, at 40. 
32 Nancy J. Whitmore, First Amendment Showdown: Intellectual Diversity Mandates and the 
Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 321, 326 (2008). 
  
 
opinions, the model has consistently produced favorable results for free speech 
interests.33 Rooted in laissez-faire economic theory, the marketplace model 
maintains that truth will emerge in the long run as long as the marketplace 
remains free from government intervention and all ideas — even those the vast 
majority believes are harmful, false and “fraught with evil”34 — have the 
opportunity to compete. Because the marketplace is self-correcting, harmful 
ideas are not to be feared. Full and open discussion will eventually expose them 
for what they are, and a public, comprised of rational individuals, will eventually 
gravitate toward sound reasoning and sensible ways of thinking.  
While a dearth of definitions or explanations regarding the marketplace 
model exists in Supreme Court decisions,35 justices have spoken eloquently 
regarding a profound belief in the “power of reason as applied through public 
discussion,”36 and a national commitment to uninhibited public debate.37 They 
have declared that it is a political duty to participate in this debate38 and linked 
participation as a means of freeing oneself from the “bondage of irrational 
fears.”39 In First Amendment jurisprudence, public discussion and debate have 
become a deep-rooted and fundamental value that is uniquely tied to an 
unfettered marketplace. To properly function, public discussion must exist in an 
open, self-regulating marketplace. A marketplace in which coerced or forced 
silence is allowed to exist will not reap the benefits sound reasoning and 
                                                
33 See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 41-42. 
34 Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandies, J., concurring). 
35 Hopkins, supra note 17, at 42. 
36 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. 
37 New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
38 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. 
39 Id. at 376. 
  
 
thoughtful deliberation are said to produce.40 On the contrary, a heavily 
regulated marketplace will eventually lead to repression, hate and instability.41 
Given the role individual expression plays in public debate, the right of 
individuals to think and speak freely and develop their faculties has also been 
noted by members of the Court as a key but not dominant First Amendment 
value.42 Individual self-actualization has, however, received a more exalted 
position within the realm of First Amendment values among certain 
commentators. In its prominent position, self-realization has been viewed as the 
“only one true value” of freedom of speech.43 Under this analysis, other values, 
such as effective self-government and the evolution of thought and provisional 
truth, are seen merely as sub-values that derive from it44 or are subordinate to it.45 
The acceptance of the ascendancy of individual fulfillment by the judiciary 
would substantially alter the construction of First Amendment law as the 
adjudication of free speech issues would be filtered through a lens that questions 
the relative potential of expression to foster self-realization or manifest 
individual choice instead of its value to the marketplace. It has been argued that 
this approach would most likely result in either the denial of constitutional 
protection to speech activities like commercial speech that are not rooted in 
individual freedom,46 or the rejection of the low value distinction speech such as 
                                                
40 See id. at 375. 
41 See id.  
42 See, e.g., Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. See also, 
BAKER, supra note 17, at 3. 
43 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). See also, 
Baker, supra note 5, at 3.   
44 See Redish, supra note 43, at 594, 611. 
45 See BAKER, supra note 17, at 24; Baker, supra note 5, at 3. 
46 See Baker, supra note 5, at 5. 
  
 
obscenity and commercial speech currently receive. 47 In the latter analysis, the 
Court’s current two-tiered approach to free speech adjudication48 would be 
replaced with a review that focuses on the ability of the expression at issue to 
foster self-realization.49 
While the Court has not justified the constitutional status of freedom of 
speech solely in terms of self-realization, the idea of an autonomous, individual 
speaker is an important concept in First Amendment law. In this traditional 
understanding of freedom of speech, the First Amendment is seen as shielding 
the street corner speaker from government restriction of unpopular expression 
and, thereby, preserving democracy and collective self-determination.50 The 
protection of individual self-fulfillment is, therefore, most valued for the utility it 
provides in fostering public debate,51 and the most cherished outcome of that 
debate is the “discovery and spread of political truth.”52 In American democracy, 
the right of every citizen to engage in political expression and association 
provides the foundation upon which government is formed53 and majority will is 
shaped and disseminated.54 Without the expression of popular political 
sentiment, representative democracy would be meaningless.55 Accordingly, 
commentators have argued that the “First Amendment should protect only 
                                                
47 See Redish, supra note 43, at 625-40.  While Baker and Redish recognize the self-
realization value of free speech, Redish argues that Baker has so narrowly defined the concept 
that he has “effectively excluded significant amounts of expression that could substantially foster 
the self-realization value.” Id. at 620. Based on this more narrow definition, Baker would deny 
constitutional protection to commercial speech while Redish would not. Id. 
48 For a discussion on the levels of First Amendment analysis, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, The 
Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 298-301 (1995); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190-200 (1983). 
49 See Redish, supra note 43, at 625-27. 
50 See Fiss, supra note 25, at 1408-10. 
51 See id. at 1410. 
52 Whitney, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
53 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
54 See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
55 See id. at 10. 
  
 
political speech or speech that is a part of democratic self-government.”56 In its 
purest form, political speech theory contends that the First Amendment 
absolutely prohibits the abridgement of speech relevant to the self-governing 
process.57 Commentators, however, have differed over the definition of 
politically relevant speech. In its most narrow form, this body of speech includes 
only explicitly political speech. Scientific or literary expression would then lie 
outside the protection of the First Amendment.58 Broader definitions of political 
speech have also been proposed that would encompass all the arts, sciences and 
humanities as well as other expression that aids an individual’s ability to self-
govern.59 Under a particularly broad-based approach, speech intended to be 
political and received as political would qualify for heightened protection.60 
Political speech theory has been “subjected to persuasive criticisms” and, 
at least in its purest form has “never been widely accepted.”61 The main 
contention centers on the complexity of accurately and effectively categorizing 
speech as either political or nonpolitical.62 Critics have noted that political speech 
can be defined so broadly that no line can effectively be drawn between the First 
Amendment’s highly protected core and its less protected fringe.63 At this stage, 
political speech theory begins to closely resemble the marketplace of ideas theory 
with the highly protected category of politically relevant speech virtually 
unlimited in its scope.64  
                                                
56 BAKER, supra note 17, at 25. 
57 See id. at 26. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 131. 
61 BAKER, supra note 17, at 25. 
62 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 27, at 47-53. 
63 See id. at 53. 
64 See BAKER, supra note 17, at 25-26. 
  
 
 While the dominance of the marketplace of ideas model as a rationale for 
freedom of speech has been noted by justices and commentators alike,65 critics of 
the theory find its logic unpersuasive66 and question whether a system of free 
expression built largely on a philosophy of unregulated private markets is 
healthy.67 Most pointedly, they criticize the theory’s false confidence in the ability 
of citizens to make rational and reasonable determinations based on their critical 
consumption of information and ideas.68 Without this foundational tenet, they 
argue, the advancement of knowledge and the search for truth are seriously 
hampered as the ability to discern truth and falsehood diminishes and the 
quality of conclusions from robust debate wanes.69 Consequently, the very 
concept of truth has been questioned with the idea of objective truth largely 
discounted.70 In the end, truth has come to be viewed as a provisional and wide-
ranging collection of responses to a particular set of circumstances and 
phenomena. The conditional and often transient nature of truth results from the 
fact that individuals most often base their perceptions upon their varying 
interests and experiences.71 As long as individuals have differing experiences, 
little opportunity exists for a homogeneous truth to emerge.72 Consequently, 
diversity and conflict continue to persist73 as truth becomes relative to the 
observer74 and “effective rewards lead people to adopt particular perspectives 
                                                
65 See, e.g., id. at 7. 
66 See, e.g., id. at 12-22. 
67 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 17-23. 
68 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 17, at 14-15; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-8 
69 See BAKER, supra note 17, at 15; Ingber, supra note 68, at 7-8. 
70 See Ingber, supra note 68, at 25; Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 673 (1986). 
71 See Ingber, supra note 68, at 25-26. 
72 See id. at 26. 
73 See id. 
74 See Wonnell, supra note 70, at 673. 
  
 
irrespective of their relation to truth, wisdom or the progressive interests of 
humanity.”75  
Even with the recognition that individuals often lack the capacity for 
rational reasoning, the marketplace model continues to dominate judicial 
thinking given the pragmatic belief that a free market — while unable to produce 
objective truth — will lead to results that are wiser, more useful and more 
desirable than the outcomes generated by an environment in which speech is 
restricted.76 Furthermore, given the fallibility of human judgment, it is feared that 
the suppression of speech activities will distort the marketplace, deepen 
irrationality and increase the probability that harmful conclusions will gain 
widespread acceptance.77 Criticisms of this modern pragmatic view of the 
marketplace theory point to the societal benefits of carefully formulated 
limitations on speech.78 They contend that while freedom of speech may help 
expose error, it may also result in new errors or block efforts to identify and 
avoid existing errors, such as racism, sexism, capitalism, consumerism and 
incivility.79 And while the argument of fallibility justifies caution, errors in 
judgment can occur with either suppression or inclusion and either choice could 
aid the entrenchment of error.80 
                                                
75 BAKER, supra note 17, at 15 
76 See id. at 19. The marketplace model predicts that a society that permits free speech will 
find itself nearer to the truth and exhibit more progress toward the truth than a similar society 
that proscribes free speech.  See Wonnell, supra note 70, at 675-76. 
77 See BAKER, supra note 17, at 18. Steven H. Shiffrin contends that it is an “‘unbeatable 
proposition’ that truth will never emerge in the marketplace if it does not get in.” SHIFFRIN, supra 
note 27, at 20. 
78 See BAKER, supra note 17, at 21. 
79 See id. at 21-22. 
80 See id. at 22. 
  
 
While the assumptions on which the classic marketplace model rest are 
almost universally rejected by the academic community,81 the notion of the 
modern marketplace has largely gained favor with the courts and scholars who 
perceived it as useful in the search for truth and knowledge and essential to 
effective popular participation in government.82 This perception has become 
entrenched in judicial thought given the belief that the quality of public 
discussion advanced by the marketplace is uniquely linked to the quality of 
democratic government.83 Given the importance of self-government in the United 
States, freedom of speech has become more valued by the judiciary for its 
collective benefits to society than its protection of individual self-fulfillment.84 
Under a collective perspective, the marketplace model looms large. It becomes 
the instrument that allows society to achieve effective self-government and in the 
process provides the justification for the extensive protection of expressive 
activities required for self-fulfillment. In the end, its utmost utility is drawn from 
the constant supply of ideas it generates and from the continual state of upheaval 
it asserts on this supply in order that even a small percentage of ideas will adapt 
and ultimately survive. 
 
THE PLACEMENT OF ECONOMIC EXPRESSION 
While the marketplace model is the dominant organizing principle upon 
which free speech law is shaped, its principal value derives from its ability to 
                                                
81 See id. at 12. 
82 See Ingber, supra note 68, at 3-4. 
83 See id. at 4. 
84 See id. See also, Fiss, supra note 25, at 1409-10. 
  
 
achieve greater goals for society.85 But like its economic cousin, the marketplace 
of ideas model can also foster harms and elicit the need for government 
regulation. For many scholars and jurists, this is particularly true when economic 
power is used for expressive purposes. Speech motivated by profit 
maximization, accordingly, causes “significant harm to the systems of free 
expression and democracy” and, therefore, “regulation of corporate and 
commercial speech is consistent with the First Amendment[].”86 Throughout the 
development of free speech law, the Court has never fully embraced and never 
fully rejected this line of reasoning. As a result, commentators have long 
complained about the lack of clarity and consistency surrounding commercial 
                                                
85 See Ingber, supra note 68, at 4. 
86 REDISH, supra note 4, at 2. 
  
 
speech doctrine87 and the incompatibility between that doctrine and Court’s 
approach to corporate political speech.88  
 
Commercial Speech  
Before Valentine v. Chrestensen89 was decided in 1942, the Court treated 
commercial speech as an economic activity subjected to protection under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.90 Commercial speech interests 
relied on the Court’s interpretation of the due process clause, which “limit[ed] 
the ability of the states to restrict economic freedom,” to overcome restrictions on 
business advertising.91 It wasn’t until the New Deal ushered in a “hostility to 
unfettered capitalism” that the Court began expanding state power over 
                                                
87 See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: 
A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 701 (2002) (concluding that 
the Court’s commercial speech doctrine is “confused and unstable”); Ronald A. Cass, Commercial 
Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1317 (1988) (explaining that 
“virtually every commentator writing about the first amendment believes that the [Supreme] 
Court’s treatment of commercial speech is wrong”); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid 
of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) (writing that the 
“commercial/noncommercial distinction makes no sense”); Thomas W. Merrill, First Amendment 
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 206 
(1976) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s rulings in commercial speech cases “may be difficult 
for lower courts to apply consistently”); Robert M. O’Neil, Nike v. Kasky—What Might Have 
Been…,” 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1259, 1259-60 (2004) (contending that Nike v. Kasky gave the 
Court an opportunity to clarify the “increasingly confusing” commercial speech doctrine); Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV 1, 2 (2000) (describing the 
commercial speech doctrine as “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First 
Amendment jurisprudence”); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON 
REG. 85, 92 (1999) (writing that “a lack of clarity continues to mark” commercial speech 
jurisprudence); Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: the State of Commercial Speech 
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 682 
(1997) (explaining that commercial speech is “in a state of constitutional limbo”); David F. 
McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 359, 360-61 (1990) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech as inconsistent and incoherent); 
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commerce.92 In this environment, Chrestensen put forth a First Amendment 
argument, claiming that a New York City ordinance prohibiting the distribution 
of commercial advertising on city streets was an unconstitutional infringement of 
freedom of speech.93 
Responding to that claim in an opinion that cites no authority for its 
judgment, the Court concluded that the First Amendment imposes no 
prohibition to government restraints on “pure[] commercial advertising.”94 
Legislative judgment, the Court explained, will determine whether to permit this 
type of business pursuit to take place on city streets.95 Furthermore, the fact that 
the double-faced handbill included a protest against government action did not 
implicate the First Amendment or change the outcome of the Court’s analysis. 
Instead, the Court determined that because the primary intention of the handbill 
was to generate income, the communication at issue must be classified as pure 
commercial advertising deserving of no First Amendment protection. 
While this case represented a departure from past claims based on the due 
process clause, the Chrestensen Court continued to view commercial speech as an 
economic activity designed to “promote or pursue a gainful occupation.”96 Its 
significance to free speech doctrine resided in the fact that the opinion made 
explicit that a communication whose primary purpose was to generate business 
profits received no First Amendment protection and, thus, “can be regulated as a 
form of economic activity.”97 The determining factor, then, was the speaker’s 
intent. If the speaker intended to use the communication to generate private 
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income, the speech would be classified as commercial, and no First Amendment 
protection would apply. 
The Chrestensen doctrine held until New York Times v. Sullivan.98 In 
Sullivan, the Court acknowledged that in certain circumstances commercially 
motivated speech — speech bought and paid for by an organization with the 
primary purpose to persuade an audience to financially support the organization 
and its mission — should be classified as political speech and receive all the 
protection the legal system gives its most cherished category of speech.99 The 
Court recognized that commercial speech is sometimes used to further debate on 
important public issues, and when it does, it deserves robust First Amendment 
protection, including protection for false speech.100 
Commentators have viewed Sullivan as a departure from the primary 
purpose of unprotected commercial speech set forth in Chrestensen.101 The 
opinion, they say, shifted the legal analysis from the purpose of the speaker to 
the content of the speech.102 In Sullivan, the Court recognized that the commercial 
format of speech does not by itself eliminate First Amendment protection.103 
Instead the Court examined the content of speech, determining the value of that 
content in the marketplace of ideas.104 This shift created a new branch of 
commercial speech, a fully protected branch that opened the way for the 
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development of a commercial speech doctrine in which even speech proposing a 
commercial transaction was deserving of some First Amendment protection.105  
In Sullivan, the Court relied primarily on principles rather than general 
rules and holdings to justify its departure from the Chrestensen doctrine. In large 
measure, these principles were drawn from a variety of cases with disparate fact 
situations and holdings,106 and constituted the background justifications upon 
which the Court believed that the advertisement at issue in Sullivan could be 
distinguished from the Chrestensen doctrine.107 Drawing on these and other legal 
authorities, the Sullivan Court set forth the purpose that the First Amendment is 
supposed to serve and against which the correctness of the judgment could be 
evaluated.108 The Court, then, disposed of the Chrestensen doctrine by amplifying 
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the importance of particular facts vis-à-vis the relevant purpose of the First 
Amendment. 
Although the speech at issue in Sullivan was both economically 
motivated109 and an issue of public importance, the Court put the emphasis on 
the latter, recognizing the public benefit in the exchange of such ideas and 
invoking the traditional speaker interests underlying First Amendment theory.110 
To view the facts otherwise, the Court said would cut off an important vehicle 
for the free flow of information.111 Moreover, the Court characterized the 
commercial communication at issue in the case as political speech and its content 
as serving the First Amendment’s public interest function in enhancing public 
knowledge and furthering public debate.112 The case also viewed the advertiser, a 
nonprofit fundraising organization,113 as an individual speaker whose 
participation in the marketplace was helping “to secure ‘the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’”114 The 
Court’s treatment of the marketplace under this theoretical structure of the First 
Amendment presupposes that the receivers of these ideas are sophisticated 
enough to judge the accuracy of information disseminated and, in turn, are 
                                                                                                                                            
(1941) (explaining that “it is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not 
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions”); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 
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and United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (explaining that the First 
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109 The advertisement included an appeal for funds. 376 U.S. at 257. 
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prepared to engage in the public debate.115 In the end, the Sullivan Court found 
no incongruity between the commercial advertisement and noncommercial 
speech.116 
Sullivan created a split based on content between purely commercial 
speech and public issue speech of a commercial nature. In the latter, the content 
is richer and more useful to the marketplace of ideas than purely commercial 
speech. Once the Court relied upon content and its value in the marketplace as 
the primary determining factor for First Amendment protection, it followed that 
the Court would find some value in purely commercial expression and, 
therefore, some First Amendment protection. With the marketplace as a central 
theoretical structure of the First Amendment, the Sullivan Court also laid the 
groundwork to expand the justification of freedom of speech beyond the confines 
of the street corner speaker and pure political speech. The concept of the 
marketplace as an imperceptible mechanism for the exchange of information and 
ideas necessary for the proper functioning of society significantly broadened the 
interests that could now be linked to free speech rights. In Bigelow v. Virginia117 
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,118 the 
Court embraced this broader focus and, as a result, struck down the state 
regulations on commercial advertising at issue in these cases. In doing so, the 
Court recognized the right of citizens to receive information and the value 
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commercial speech afforded individual decision-making as legitimate First 
Amendment interests.119 Given these enhanced interests, the Court found “no 
justification for excluding commercial speech from First Amendment 
protection”120 and fully rejected the notion that speech related to the economic 
marketplace has no value to the marketplace of ideas.121 
At first blush, Bigelow and Virginia Board of Pharmacy appeared to diminish 
the distinction between economic expression and public interest discussion122 
and extinguish any vestiges of the two-level theory of free speech protection123 
outlined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.124 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the 
Court concluded that even speech that does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction contributes to the exposition of ideas, 125 and provides the public with 
indispensible information upon which intelligent opinions are based as to the 
“proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system” and “how that system 
ought to be regulated or altered.”126 Commercial speech, the Court noted, 
provides as significant a benefit to society as political discussion and may likely 
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be more useful to the public than the most urgent political debate.127 Relying on 
the theoretical structures of the marketplace, the Court eschewed public 
ignorance precipitated by a government ban on the dissemination of prescription 
drug prices. The best interests of the public, the Court said, are achieved through 
open channels of communication that work to inform and educate all 
consumers128 even those who are poor, sick and aged.129 An open marketplace 
allows these consumers to learn where their scarce dollars are best spent130 and to 
determine which economic choice is in their own best interest.131 Commercial 
speech bans, the Court said, work to frustrate this choice in an effort to 
manipulate consumer behavior by suppressing valuable information.132 The 
result is a highly paternalistic public policy approach that violates the First 
Amendment, diminishes self-determination and depletes the marketplace of 
information. 
Justice Harry Blackmun’s appeal in Virginia Board of Pharmacy to self-
governance focuses on the rights of citizens to receive commercial information 
and the subsequent impact of that information on the formation of opinions and 
decisions.133 In this manner, the development of the commercial speech doctrine 
tracks closely with Alexander Meiklejohn’s analysis134 and the view that what is 
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essential in public discourse is that citizens are “‘aware of all the options and in 
possession of all the relevant information.’”135 In the end, the fact that the impact 
of commercial information on the formation of public opinion and consumer 
choice is largely a by-product of the speaker’s economic intent136 is viewed as 
inconsequential to the fact that such information can “enlighten public decision-
making in a democracy.”137  
While the idea that a purely economic intent by the speaker disqualifies 
speech from protection under the First Amendment was largely discounted in 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy,138  both Bigelow and Virginia Board of Pharmacy 
recognized that in certain contexts commercial speech is ripe for regulation and 
exclusion from constitutional protection.139 In doing so, however, both cases fell 
short of identifying the elements that define commercial speech140 and set up an 
incoherence that continues to haunt the commercial speech doctrine to this day. 
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court noted that commercial speech is not 
“wholly undifferentiable from other forms” of speech and “commonsense 
differences” between commercial speech and other varieties of speech do exist. 141 
But the Court did not provide a distinct definition of commercial speech that 
went beyond an earlier description of speech that does “no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”142 And yet the Court said that these commonsense 
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differences justify disparate treatment of some forms of commercial speech so 
that the “flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is 
unimpaired.”143 To this day, the determination of whether the speech at issue is 
commercial speech and, therefore, constitutionally restricted in certain contexts 
lies at the center of many commercial speech disputes.144 
While no dominant test for determining commercial speech exists,145 the 
Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.146 considered a combination of three 
characteristics — advertising format, reference to product and economic 
motivation — as strong support for a determination of commercial expression.147 
However, the Court noted that the presence of any one of the three will not by 
itself render the speech at issue commercial.148 The California Supreme Court 
relied on Bolger in Kasky v. Nike149 to render a public relations campaign that 
included editorials, press releases and letters to critics and athletic directors at 
colleges and universities commercial speech.150 While Nike’s communications did 
not involve product references or appear in an advertising format, the California 
Supreme Court determined that communications “directed by a commercial 
speaker to a commercial audience” that contained “representations of fact about 
the speaker’s own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its 
products” constituted commercial speech.151 
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Regardless of its inability to universally define commercial speech, 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy is viewed as a high point in the constitutional 
protection of commercial speech.152 From a theoretical standpoint, the opinion 
forged a rationale for economic expression based on the interlinking values of 
truth, self-realization and self-government.153 But while these values were used to 
secure First Amendment protection for commercial speech, the Court also relied 
upon the profit motive involved to justify a strict standard of accuracy — a 
standard that solicitations for contributions to nonprofit organizations did not 
receive.154 The Court based this distinction upon two characteristics of profit-
driven commercial speech. The Court said that such speech was “more easily 
verifiable by its disseminator” and had a greater ability to withstand sanctions 
than other forms of expression.155 Bolstered by an economic motive, commercial 
speakers are viewed as more determined to thwart regulatory restrictions than 
other speakers. Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the threat of 
sanctions for false or misleading statements would not chill commercial speech 
to the same degree it would political commentary or news reporting.156 
Moreover, the Court strongly suggested that it was not extending constitutional 
protection to false or misleading commercial speech.157 The reliance upon the 
profit motive of advertisers to justify restrictions on false or misleading 
                                                
152 See Costello, supra note 87, at 683-84, 691; McGowan, supra note 87, at 365-66; Waters, 
supra note 87, at 1633-34. 
153 See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 411, 453 (1992). In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court also addressed the relationship 
between economic expression and the argument that the principal purpose of the First 
Amendment is to foster democracy. “Even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily 
an instrument to enlighten public decision making in a democracy,” the Court held, the free flow 
of commercial information would serve that goal. 425 U.S. at 765. 
154 Compare Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.24 (1976), with New York Times 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 271-72 (1964). 
155 Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 
156 Id. at 771-72. 
157 Id. 
  
 
commercial speech, however, altered the Court’s prior statements asserting that 
economic intent was irrelevant in commercial speech analysis158 and ultimately 
resulted in a tiered system of free speech protection in which inaccurate 
commercial statements received no constitutional protection.159 
To ensure that the Sullivan principle that false speech must be tolerated in 
the marketplace to avoid a chilling effect on public discussion did not apply to 
commercial speech, the Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission160 devised a four-part test that unequivocally afforded no 
constitutional protection to false or misleading commercial speech. The opinion, 
which “drastically restructured the commercial speech doctrine,”161 described 
commercial speech in expansive profit-making terms as “expression related 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” and “speech 
proposing a commercial transaction.”162 In a concurrence, Justice John Paul 
Stevens responded to the ambiguity of the Court’s description and the potential 
damage that arises to First Amendment freedoms when commercial speech is 
defined too broadly. He questioned whether the definition “uses the subject 
matter of the speech or the motivation of the speaker as the limiting factor.”163 
Either way, Justice Stevens said the definition “is unquestionably too broad”164 
and “encompasses speech that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by 
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the First Amendment.”165 The idea that speech, which was thought to be fully 
protected, could now be labeled commercial speech was especially troublesome 
given that Central Hudson strayed from the promise that the state may not restrict 
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech of a lawful activity to manipulate the 
effect the expression may have upon its audience.166 In Central Hudson, the 
regulation at issue banned promotional advertising by an electric utility to 
dampen unnecessary growth in energy consumption.167 Justices concurring in the 
judgment found the state’s justification for the regulation as “nothing more than 
the expressed fear that the audience may find the utility’s message 
persuasive.”168 Conveying a similar point, the Court conceded that government 
sought to pursue a “nonspeech-related policy” through its ban on promotional 
advertising and that prior case law had never upheld a blanket ban on 
commercial speech unless the expression itself was deceptive or related to 
unlawful activity.169 Consequently, the Court said special care was required in 
this case.170 
For the Court, special care came in the formulation of a four-part analysis 
that first determined whether the speech in question concerned a lawful activity 
and was not misleading or false. If so, the commercial speech at issue would fall 
within the protection of the First Amendment, and government’s attempt to 
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regulate it would need to be justified. Basically a type of intermediate scrutiny 
then would be applied in which government would need to show that the 
regulation is furthering a substantial state interest, directly advances the interest 
asserted, and is no more extensive than is necessary to serve the interest.171 At the 
time of the decision, Justice Blackmun expressed doubt that the test was the 
“proper one to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a 
product in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot 
or has not regulated or outlawed directly.”172 Citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. 
Willingboro,173 a case which overturned a ban on “For Sale” signs on residential 
property to promote stable, racially integrated housing, Justice Blackmun 
asserted that a “strict standard of review applies to suppression of commercial 
information, where the purpose of the restraint is to influence behavior by 
depriving citizens of information.”174 Intermediate scrutiny, Justice Blackmun 
wrote, was appropriate for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect 
consumers from deception or coercion.175 True consumer protection interests 
such as these speak to the “commonsense differences” between commercial 
speech and other categories of speech. It would, therefore, be highly unlikely that 
a speaker who is willing to engage in deceptive or coercive expression to 
convince a consumer to complete a commercial transaction would be chilled by 
the existence of regulations on such speech.176 While the lack of a chilling effect 
on deceptive or coercive commercial expression justifies an intermediate review 
standard, no such justification exists when truthful commercial speech for a 
                                                
171 Id. at 564. 
172 Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
173 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
174 447 U.S. at 577 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
175 Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
176 Id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
  
 
lawful activity is suppressed to influence public conduct through the 
manipulation of available information.177  
Since its inception, the Central Hudson test, as it has come to be called, has 
been roundly criticized for its subjective nature.178 Commentators have 
complained that the test is applied “with varying degrees of scrutiny,”179 
resulting in “problematic styles of reasoning,”180 “inconsistent … commercial 
speech jurisprudence and … confusion in the lower courts.”181 The lack of 
uniform implementation of the rule is most likely a symptom of the 
indeterminate nature of immediate scrutiny standards182 and the ambiguity 
inherent in the effort to enlarge the scope of permissible expression within the 
marketplace. By granting at least partial protection to commercial speech, 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy attempted to create a better-informed community of 
consumers. While subsequent opinions have recognized that purpose,183 areas of 
contention remain. Most importantly is the lack of a coherent theoretical 
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structure that can be reconciled with Sullivan and the Court’s treatment of 
ideological speech. While verifiability and durability remain the central 
theoretical justifications provided by the Court for the disparate treatment of 
commercial speech, justices and commentators have questioned the logic of this 
rationale and called for greater protection of commercial information.184 
Especially troubling for some is the Court’s treatment of paternalistic regulations 
intended to further policy goals through blanket bans on truthful consumer 
information. As Justice Blackmun argued in his concurrence in Central Hudson, 
the value commercial speech asserts on the marketplace cannot be reconciled 
with regulations intended to keep consumers ignorant and manipulated in order 
to foster public policy aims. For if commercial speech receives its constitutional 
status from the “indispensible information” it provides, how can the Court 
justify applying a malleable intermediate standard185 to blanket bans on that 
information? To allow government to pick and choose what it considers 
indispensible and what it considers dispensable to the marketplace, provides 
government with the power to manipulate consumer choice and thwarts the 
aims of a free market in information and ideas. For this reason, Justice 
Blackmun’s call for a stricter review standard for paternalistic restrictions on 
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commercial speech has resurfaced in cases from time to time although it has 
never garnered a majority following.186 
 The idea that no real distinction exists between commercial and 
noncommercial speech in cases involving the suppression of truthful information 
about legal products speaks to the rationality of the audience and the collective 
nature of the market. Theoretically, intelligence and rational decision-making are 
an outgrowth of a market in which information is transmitted among groups of 
individuals and where ideas are dependent upon their human carriers and the 
environment for their survival and development.187 For this reason, various 
members of the Court and at times the Court itself have stressed the importance 
of  
 
free dissemination of information about commercial choices in a market 
economy; the anti-paternalistic premises of the First Amendment; the 
impropriety of manipulating consumer choices or public opinion through 
the suppression of accurate “commercial” information; the near 
impossibility of severing “commercial” speech from speech necessary to 
democratic decision making; and the dangers of permitting the 
government to do covertly what it might not have been able to muster the 
political support to do openly.188  
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But the Court has also upheld paternalistic regulations fearing that 
unsophisticated consumers would be unable to discern misleading information 
from factual statements.189  
In upholding paternalistic regulations, the Court has noted a correlation 
between consumption and advertising. Advertising, justices contend, increases 
the demand for products such as alcohol, gambling or cigarettes. 190 Although 
lawful, government heavily regulates the use of these products through taxation 
and age restrictions in order to diminish the harmful effects over indulgence can 
cause. When such restrictions do not provide enough of a deterrent, government 
has turned to directly regulating the promotion of these products through 
prohibitions on advertising.191 In 1986, the Court upheld a ban on casino 
advertising in Posadas v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico192 through a weak 
application of the Central Hudson test that granted increased deference to 
governmental claims that the regulation at issue curbed harmful secondary 
effects attributed to casino gambling.193 Controversy surrounding this case led to 
a plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island194 that maintained that the 
Court “erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis”195 in Posadas by 
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utilizing a “highly deferential approach”196 in its application of the Central 
Hudson test. Since Posadas, the Court has “declined to accept at face value the 
proffered justification” for the restriction on commercial speech and instead has 
engaged in a more rigorous examination of the relationship between the aims 
asserted by government and the means used to achieve those aims.197 While 
concern still arises among members of the Court over the Central Hudson test and 
whether it gives sufficient protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial 
speech,198 commentators have found that the Court no longer grants deference to 
governmental interests or upholds reasonable restrictions on commercial speech 
as it once did, but instead applies Central Hudson in an increasingly rigorous 
manner that emphasizes the test’s last two prongs.199   
 
Corporate Speech 
The precarious position commercial speech occupies within the body of 
free speech adjudication has produced a spillover effect with regards to 
corporate speech. In Kasky v. Nike,200 the speech at issue, much of which 
concerned a political and social issue, would have most likely received 
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maximum First Amendment protection prior to 1976 regardless of the economic 
status of the speaker.201 Decades later, the commercial nature of Nike’s factual 
assertions landed those statements in the lower rungs of the constitutional 
ladder202 and, as a result, precluded Nike from engaging in false or misleading 
speech in an effort to thwart criticism of the company’s labor practices.203 The 
speech at issue included descriptions of Nike’s labor policies and practices as 
well as the working conditions in the factories where Nike products are made.204 
In doing so, Nike addressed personnel and employment matters that were 
readily verifiable and “within its own knowledge,” including employee wages, 
hours worked, treatment, environmental conditions, and health and safety 
laws.205 
At issue upon appeal to the Supreme Court was the question of “whether 
a corporation participating in a public debate may ‘be subjected to liability for 
factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are “commercial speech” 
because they might affect consumers’ opinions about the business as a good 
corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions.’”206 The Court 
dismissed the case as improvidently granted without resolving the question at 
issue.207 
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Kasky stands in stark contrast to First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,208 a 
1978 corporate speech case that discounted the economic strength of the speaker 
and focused, instead, on the inherent worth of the speech to the marketplace.209 
The speech at issue in Bellotti involved a proposed ballot question that would 
permit the Massachusetts legislature to impose a graduated tax on the income of 
individuals.210 The First National Bank of Boston wanted to publicize its views on 
the ballot measure, but a state statute prohibiting corporations from making 
expenditures for the purpose of influencing a vote stood in the way.211 In striking 
down the statute, the Court noted that it is the inherent worth of speech that 
matters, not the identity of the speaker. Given the importance of the speech to 
democratic decision making, a prohibition on such expression would be clearly 
unconstitutional if it applied to an individual speaker.212 The same expression, 
the Court said, does not lose its marketplace value or its constitutional protection 
simply because the speaker is a corporation.213 
In Bellotti, the Court used recent commercial speech cases to rebut the 
argument that corporate speech rights should apply only to expression that 
materially affects the business interests of a corporation. The Court said that 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Linmark Associates illustrate that the First 
Amendment “prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of information 
from which members of the public may draw.”214 As a result, the economic effect 
of the information on the speaker’s interests is not the central constitutional 
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question. Instead, economic expression garners its free speech protection from 
the fact that it “furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial 
information.’”215 Consequently, the constitutionality of regulations that prohibit 
the “exposition of ideas” by economic speakers will turn on whether those 
restrictions can survive the same exacting scrutiny as the Court applies to 
government restrictions on an individual’s right to engage in public debate.216 
Unlike the Central Hudson test, strict scrutiny requires the government to 
show that the regulation serves a compelling state interest217 and the means to 
accomplish that interest are the least destructive of free speech rights.218 The most 
favorable standard to free speech interests, strict scrutiny is employed when 
restrictions limit expression on the basis of viewpoint or content.219 Relying on 
Bellotti and its focus on the inherent worth of speech in the marketplace,220 the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down two statutes targeting the content 
contained in a private utility’s billing envelope.221 In both cases, the Court 
dismissed the identity of the corporate speaker as not decisive222 and determined 
that state action had limited protected speech. In Consolidated Edison Company of 
New York v. Public Service Commission of New York,223 a state statute prohibited the 
inclusion of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy,224 and in 
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Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,225 a California 
statute mandated the inclusion of content from a consumer-based interest 
group.226 Both statutes, the Court said, were impermissible content-based 
regulations that were not narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest.227  As 
a result, they directly infringed the First Amendment rights of corporate 
speakers.   
Corporate speech statutes that restrict the use of general treasury funds 
for independent expenditures in connection with candidate elections also trigger 
the application of strict scrutiny. Such statutes restrict political speech based on 
the speaker’s perceived economic strength and ensuing capability to corrupt the 
political process. Government contends that for-profit corporations with their 
ability to accumulate immense wealth through a state-conferred corporate 
structure threaten to distort the marketplace of ideas and improperly influence 
election outcomes. The prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
thus, becomes the justification for restrictions on ideological corporate speech. 
In Bellotti, the Court rejected the argument that corporate participation in 
the referendum process would “drown out other points of view” and “destroy 
the confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of 
government.”228 Furthermore, the Bellotti Court found no evidence in the record 
to support the contention that corporate advocacy threatened to undermine the 
democratic process. This line of thought continued in Federal Election Commission 
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v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,229 in which the Court dismissed the government’s 
concerns regarding the threat to the political process from participation by a 
nonprofit corporate interest that was formed to disseminate ideas rather than to 
amass capital. The “potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political 
purposes,” the Court concluded, is not implicated when the resources 
aggregated are “not a function of an entity’s success in the economic marketplace 
but its popularity in the political marketplace.”230 While corporate speech 
interests were upheld in Bellotti and MCFL, the Court also signaled in MCFL that 
the use of resources in the treasury of a business corporation could present an 
unfair advantage in the political marketplace. The Court noted that the 
expenditure of treasury funds for political purposes “may make a corporation a 
formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be 
no reflection of the power of its ideas.”231 The idea that a corporation’s economic 
power could justify state restrictions on corporate political speech was soon 
tested and ultimately reinforced in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce.232  
In Austin, the Court upheld a state regulation that prohibited business 
corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures in 
connection with a candidate election for public office. Relying on MCFL and FEC 
v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,233 the Court recognized the 
compelling interest in the prevention of corruption or the appearance of 
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corruption in the political process through the influence of economic power.234   
The Court explained: 
 
State law grants corporations special advantages — such as limited 
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets — that enhance their ability to attract capital and to 
deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their 
shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only allow 
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also 
permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” to 
obtain “an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”235  
 
 In Austin, the Court linked the perceived economic strength of an idea, 
measured in terms of the state-conferred corporate form of the speaker, to the 
idea’s potential for producing harmful effects in the ideas market. With this 
linkage, the Court effectively moved away from Bellotti and a market-based 
approach in which the inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity to 
inform public discussion and decision-making ultimately held constitutional 
sway.236 In Austin, the Court accepted the government’s contention that the 
“unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some 
regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance 
of corruption.”237 The corruption at issue in Austin involved the “corrosive and 
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distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” accumulated under the 
corporate form and used to disseminate political ideas which have little or no 
support from the public.238 With an anti-distortion rationale as a recognized 
compelling interest, the Court upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance Act as 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve this goal given that corporations 
remained free to express their political views through independent expenditures 
from separate segregated funds that are amassed from voluntary contributions 
from individuals associated with the corporation.239 
The course set in Austin and followed in McConnell v. FEC240 would 
eventually experience a directional turnaround in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.241 In Citizens United, the Court addressed whether a 
corporate speech ban on electioneering communication made within thirty days 
of a primary or sixty days of a general election was constitutional. An element of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, the restriction prohibited 
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate 
for Federal office” and is made within a prohibited timeframe.242 Although this 
provision of the BCRA was upheld in McConnell,243 the Citizens United Court used 
an action in which the provision was applied to an advocacy organization to 
consider whether Austin should be overruled.244 The organization, Citizens 
United, accepted corporate funding and wanted to use its financial resources to 
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promote and disseminate a ninety-minute documentary about then Senator 
Hillary Clinton, who was, at the time, a Democratic candidate in the 2008 
presidential primary elections. Citizens United planned to make the film 
available free of charge to digital cable subscribers via video-on-demand within 
the restricted time frame. Based on the case-specific facts, the Court noted that 
the action could not be resolved on narrower grounds. The film, the Court held, 
clearly qualified as electioneering communication as defined by BCRA, was the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy and was funded in part from for-profit 
corporations.245 Furthermore, the medium of distribution was specified in the act, 
and the Court was not at liberty to carve out an exception to the act based on the 
perceived effectiveness of video-on-demand to influence viewers.246  
In its adjudication of the case, the Court returned to a market-based 
approach. The restriction on corporate expenditures, the Court said, “[S]ilence[s] 
entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”247 As a result, the 
statute “‘reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.’”248 The First Amendment, the Court explained, stands against such 
attempts to disfavor and distinguish among certain subjects, viewpoints and 
speakers. To allow speech by some speakers but not by others is “all too often 
simply a means to control the content” of the marketplace and “deprive the 
public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers 
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are worthy of consideration.”249 In its opinion, the Court noted the essential role 
speech plays in a democracy. It is the means, the Court held, by which the public 
holds officials accountable, obtains information from diverse sources and makes 
determinations regarding who will be elected to serve.250 Given the storied 
position political speech holds in the nation’s development, the doctrinal 
adherence to free and full public discussion, and the explicit pre-Austin holdings 
that prohibited restrictions on political speech based on a speakers’ corporate 
identity, the Court reasoned that Austin was an outlier that changed the natural 
course of First Amendment law. 
In Citizens United, the Court relied heavily on the principle that “political 
speech does not lose its First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is 
a corporation.’”251 This principle — a key holding in Bellotti — should have 
invalidated government bans on independent expenditures by a corporation to 
support candidates in subsequent cases, the Court noted.252 Instead, Austin 
upheld such a restriction by finding a compelling interest in an anti-distortion 
rationale.253 The Citizen United Court found this rationale flawed on First 
Amendment grounds. The First Amendment, the Court held, prohibits the 
suppression of political speech based on a speaker’s wealth and regards as 
irrelevant the correlation between the amount of public support for an idea and 
the amount of money used to disseminate it. 254 According to the Court, “All 
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the 
economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment,” the Court 
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held, “protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by economic 
transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”255 
The Court also took issue with the assumption that restrictions on 
corporate expenditures are aimed at the “‘distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth.’”256 Noting that 96% of businesses that belong to the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce have fewer than 100 employees,257 the Court concluded 
that the restrictions at issue amounted to censorship and thought control.258 The 
government, the Court said, “seeks to use its full power, including the criminal 
law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what 
distrusted source he or she may not hear.”259 The Court called such action 
unlawful and a violation not only of the right to think for oneself260 but also of 
the marketplace principle, which favors the inclusion of voices and viewpoints, 
entrusting to the people the ultimate responsibility of separating truth from 
falsehood.261 In the end, the Court overruled Austin and returned to the principle 
established in Buckley v. Valeo262 and Bellotti that government “may not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient 
governmental interest,” the Court held, “justifies limits on the political speech of 
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”263 Preventing corruption or the appearance 
of corruption is, therefore, limited to the type of quid pro quo corruption at issue 
                                                
255 Id.  
256 Id. at 907 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
257 Id.  
258 Id. at 908. 
259 Id.  
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 906-07. 
262 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
263 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
  
 
in Buckley.264 In Buckley, the Court upheld limits on direct contributions to 
candidates to ensure against the reality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption. 
This type of corruption, the Citizens United Court concluded, was not extended to 
independent expenditures and is distinguished from favoritism and influence, 
which are unavoidable in a representative democracy and, as justifications for 
restrictions on speech, are at odds with the First Amendment due to their 
unbounded and limitless nature.265  
In keeping with the marketplace principle that more speech, not less, is 
the governing rule,266 the Citizens United Court upheld the statute’s disclaimer 
and disclosure requirement. While disclaimers and disclosures burden speech,267 
the Court said the public’s interest in knowing who is speaking about a 
candidate shortly before an election justifies the regulation on speech.268 At the 
very least, the Court said, disclaimers avoid confusion by making it clear that a 
candidate or political party is not funding the message.269 Furthermore, the 
transparency they provide enables the electorate to make an informed decision 
and properly assess the importance of different speakers and messages.270  
In both commercial and corporate speech law, a contention has developed 
regarding the degree of harm required to circumvent free speech protection. In 
commercial speech, a minority of justices has called for stricter review standards 
for paternalistic restrictions on truthful nonmisleading commercial information, 
arguing that a relaxed constitutional review is appropriate only when evaluating 
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challenges to regulations aimed at protecting consumers from deceptive or 
coercive commercial expression. In corporate speech law, the Court changed 
course from prior case law and held that only quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance thereof constituted grounds for regulation of corporate political 
speech. Both arguments embrace a free market approach to economic expression, 
and place the ultimate responsibility for an idea’s adaptation and ultimate 
survival in the hands of the consuming public. 
 
Economic Markets and Speech Markets 
In economic parlance, the market is an ideological construct that is laden with 
assumptions about the role of consumers, suppliers and the expected outcomes 
of their interactions.271 The idea that the ultimate outcome of these interactions in 
a free market system is increased productivity, a gradual rise in wages and, in 
the long run, greatly improve living standards has remained essentially 
unchanged since Adam Smith introduced the concept in 1776.272 Smith based his 
free market philosophy on the belief that the ultimate goal of any economic 
system was the maximization of a country’s wealth.273 The attainment of this goal 
was possible, according to Smith, if the economy was free of artificial restraints 
that stifled openness and competition.274 Smith’s market-driven, consumer-based 
economic system was a reaction against mercantilism — an economic and 
political system in place at the time that benefited producers and entrenched 
interests at the expense of the consumer who was routinely confronted with 
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inflated prices for domestically produced goods.275 Smith strongly emphasized 
that commercial regulations were the result of political pressure from dealers 
who wanted to widen the market and narrow the competition.276  In turn, the 
economic system that Smith envisioned relied on the competitive market forces 
of supply and demand277 to produce a self-regulating mechanism or invisible 
hand that would satisfy human wants while stimulating technological 
innovations and minimizing waste.278  
In a fully competitive market, the invisible hand regulates supply and 
demand through the fluctuation of prices. This self-regulation mechanism 
ensures that finite human and physical resources are directed to where they are 
most agreeable to the desires of society.279 In the end, an efficient market system 
is formed in which prices account for the trillions of voluntary transactions 
between buyers and sellers and signal the marginal value and cost of goods to 
the players involved.280 This system ultimately brings order to the marketplace as 
an unintended consequence of the interactions of a multitude of economic actors 
who are each seeking to further their own self-interest.281  
Under a free market approach, human selfishness is good for the economy as 
individual wants and desires work to create wealth and elevate the standard of 
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living for an entire economy.282 As a result, self-reliance and freedom of choice 
are valued, and the use of state power to manage the economy and manipulate 
market behavior is feared.283 Critics of this approach contend that regulation is 
necessary to stabilize and fine tune the economy,284 and point to the mass 
unemployment and plunging levels of productivity in the 1930s, which helped to 
ushered in a loss of faith in the free market,285 as support for their position. In this 
era, competition was still desirable but only up to a point.286 Given the 
widespread unemployment and economic devastation that occurred during this 
time, regulatory redress was extended to individuals who needed protection 
against the types of hardship that had previously been accepted as a fact of life.287 
Once protection against economic hardship became a legitimate basis for 
regulatory intervention, the logical basis for limiting it diminished and 
protection of industries, firms and individuals that were likely to be losers in the 
competitive struggles combined with restraints on those that were likely to be 
winners in the economic scene.288 This protectionist philosophy expanded the 
boundary of existing regulations and led to a loss of resistance to a managed 
economy.289 As a result, the regulatory period expanded in the 1960s and 1970s. 
During these decades, “[M]ore new regulatory agencies and activities were 
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started than during any comparable period” of U.S. history.290 The dominant 
target of these activities was the social costs or spillover effects on third parties 
from the exchange process.291  
The classic example of these spillover effects or what economists call adverse 
externalities is air or water pollution — a ubiquitous byproduct of consumer 
demand that imposes costs on elements of society that are unaffiliated with the 
production and exchange process that produced the pollution in the first place.292 
In this regard, the full costs incurred by the exchange process are not borne by 
the actors involved in it. Instead spillover costs, that is, pollution, are incurred by 
third parties, leaving the producers of pollution with little to no incentive to 
engage in expensive activities to abate the adverse externalities they have 
produced.293 In such a situation, government intervention, mandating the 
installation of a pollution abatement system, for example, may be warranted to 
correct the market defect.294 Because adverse externalities are a pervasive and 
formidable byproduct of a free market system, regulatory efforts to mitigate or 
control these social costs are potentially limitless and often ineffective at 
eliminating or preventing the problem.295 Moreover the very vastness of the 
problem leads to charges of market failure as anticipated benefits from the free 
market process are achieved at higher than anticipated costs or not realized at 
all.296 Supporters of a free market system, while acknowledging these spillover 
effects, warn that optimal regulation is exceedingly difficult to attain and even 
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seemingly sensible rules that solve some problems will often lead to the creation 
of new inefficiencies that greatly offset any benefits produced.297 
Like its economic cousin, the marketplace of ideas model contends that 
optimal benefits will occur from a hands-off government approach to regulation 
of speech activities.298 Free idea markets are much more likely than state-
managed markets to produce the provisional truth and knowledge essential for 
effective self-government and individual realization. Management of idea 
markets, like the management of economic markets, skews outcomes and leads 
to results that are problematic and undesirable. Free markets, on the other hand, 
that rely on the desire of individuals to pursue a rational end — be it the 
maximization of pleasure or the acceptance of ideas that are wise and useful — 
produce results that are beneficial to society. Nonetheless, as in the economic 
arena, the utilitarian focus of a free speech market has, throughout history, been 
overshadowed by the harmful outcomes that can be tied to the absence of 
regulation. When adverse outcomes occur, the free market approach is said to 
have failed and calls for regulatory redress to correct social costs are common.  
Given the tendency of economic markets to produce a vast array of adverse 
externalities, it is understandable that a regulatory approach for economic 
expression emerged over time. Like the regulatory regime in the 1930s, 
restrictions on economic speech are often aimed at preventing hardships that 
result from poor purchasing decisions and lifestyle choices. This paternalistic 
approach seeks to manipulate individual behavior through blanket bans on 
economic expression in order to prevent economic power from distorting and 
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corrupting the speech market in its quest to reap financial gains. With various 
members of the Court signaling a willingness to embrace a free market approach 
for economic expression, how likely is it that constitutional protection for profit-
driven speech will produce the harmful effects that regulation of that market was 
intended to prevent? Detractors of a free market approach fear that economic 
power will distort the true outputs of the speech market by drowning out the 
expression of those with fewer economic resources.299 Supporters of the approach 
counter that expression often requires significant financial resources.300 They say 
that restrictions, which reduce the sum total of expression, foster public 
ignorance and create a viewpoint bias that runs counter to the central values of 
the First Amendment.301 A speech market prone to government-induced 
viewpoint bias can no longer function effectively and efficiently in its effort to 
produce provisional truth and knowledge. Instead, it resembles an economic 
market in which government-induced price controls have frustrated the market’s 
ability to effectively reflect the demand preferences of consumers.  
The dispute over the costs and benefits of a hands-off regulatory approach 
centers on the role individualism, rationality, power and harm play in a free 
market system. As envisioned by Smith, the concept of a free market rests on an 
individualistic view of society, and the belief that people, who are free to engage 
in voluntary exchange motivated by individual self-interest, will produce 
collective advancements in social welfare.302 The idea that individual freedoms 
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can produce collective goods is not unique to economic theory. Freedom of 
expression, which rests on the right of an individual to think and speak freely, 
has been lauded as an essential element in advancing knowledge and 
discovering truth, establishing a means for participation in collective decision 
making and achieving a more adaptable and stable society.303 While these 
individualist philosophies value individual abilities,304 in reality, an autonomous 
individual acting independently and solely in her own best interest is rare. 
Instead, individuals tend to form groups with regards to both expression and 
business in an effort to have a greater return on investment and a greater effect 
on the market. Because efficiencies are created in speech and economic markets 
when individuals come together for a shared/collective purpose, herd behaviors 
are common in both markets. These behaviors have been noted by economists 
who point out that in certain circumstances it is more advantageous for an 
individual to mimic the actions of others rather than to trust one’s own 
judgment.305 For example, a fund manager who follows the crowd with regards 
to investment decisions will share the blame with others if things turn out badly, 
whereas the manager who follows his own divergent strategy will bear the sole 
responsibility for the mistake.306 Because an individual who follows the herd will 
maintain a reputation if the collective judgment is misguided and enhance a 
reputation if the judgment reaps benefits, the decision to follow the herd is 
viewed as rational.  
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The concept of rationality lies at the heart of speech and economic market 
philosophy and has been adopted by a wide range of disciplines, including law 
and economics, as their “central account of human decision making.”307 While 
debate surrounds the exact definition of the concept,308 within law and economics 
it is used as a predictive model built on the assumption that in the aggregate 
people respond to incentives309 and will choose the best means available to 
achieve their goal.310 Although the concept implies an explicit cost-benefit 
analysis, a rational choice does not necessarily involve a conscious decision or 
“entail either complete information or error-free reasoning from available 
information.”311 Because information is costly in time to obtain and process, 
individuals also engage in rational decision making when they act on incomplete 
information or use mental and emotional shortcuts to reach conclusions.312 
Emotion and ideology, therefore, can be powerful tools in swaying individual 
judgment.313  
This is particularly evident when it comes to choices involving the political 
process. Because one vote has so small a probability of affecting an electoral 
outcome and the time needed to acquire and analyze political information is 
significant, voters who choose to cast their votes according to emotional and 
ideological shortcuts are also acting rationally. Likewise, as the personal cost of 
tossing information gathering and analysis aside increases, individuals will rely 
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less on such “rationally irrational” shortcuts. 314 In the end, the concept of 
rationality may well prompt an individual to engage in a cognitive reasoning 
process that is fully detached from any emotional or ideological attachment, or it 
may foster a thought process that allows for the acceptance of a political position 
that is inconsistent with one’s material self-interest. 
The concept of rational irrationality can be tied to a whole host of behaviors 
that belie reasoned decision making.  For example, the psychological benefits of 
being associated with a particular idea coupled with the low probability of 
decisiveness and the high cost of deliberative analysis can produce support for 
counterproductive policies and worldviews.315 Irrationality, then, makes the 
individual better off as long as the psychological benefits minus the material 
costs are positive. Because, in the realm of democracy, the probability of casting 
the decisive vote is near zero, an individual is better off getting a sense of 
meaning and identity from his counterproductive worldview than from 
engaging in the high cost of research and analysis in order to cast a largely non-
decisive vote rationally.316  
While irrationality is the rational choice for individuals in these 
circumstances, the potential social costs of this behavior to the democratic 
process can be alarming especially when powerful economic interests are 
involved. The belief that powerful economic interests have to a large extent 
hijacked the democratic process has long been the cause of much concern. With 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, this concern has only intensified. 
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The decision, which negated the assumption that unlimited corporate spending 
in elections has a corrupting impact on the political process, is being blamed for 
the large influx of money spent on the 2010 midterm election by groups that are 
largely anonymous.317 Although the decision upheld disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements, IRS regulations provide donor confidentiality to 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organizations, 501(c)(5) labor organizations and 501(c)(6) trade 
associations and chambers of commerce. These organizations are now able to 
engage in political activities without disclosing the names of their donors as long 
as these activities do not represent the primary purpose of the organizations.318  
 The Sunlight Foundation calculated the effect of Citizens United on the 
2010 midterm election. The Foundation reported that the decision was 
responsible for adding $126 million in undisclosed spending by outside groups 
and $60 million in disclosed spending by outside groups to the midterm 
election.319 The $186 million made possible by Citizens United represented 40% of 
the total election spending by outside groups.320 The ability to increase spending 
some 40% in less than ten months from unknown sources with unknown 
interests certainly raises eyebrows and the apprehension that the very corruption 
and distortion the Court said was not implicated by campaign finance regulation 
does indeed exist. This apprehension is exacerbated by the high and largely 
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insurmountable cost of rational analysis and research. Even investigative 
reporters and organizations whose primary purpose is to track the sources of 
election spending have been largely unable to uncover the names of individuals 
behind these generic and nebulous outside groups.321 
While the Court may have miscalculated the effect of its decision, it, more 
importantly, upheld the disclosure and disclaimer requirements. Embracing the 
open market concept, the Court reasoned that “transparency enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages.”322 Because full transparency reduces the time it takes to 
find information, it works to lower the cost of the deliberative process and 
delineate the exact cost or benefit of being associated with a particular 
ideological group. In the current marketplace, however, certain organizations are 
exempt from disclosure and disclaimer requirements. The key, then, is to 
override this exemption and create a reliable source of information that can be 
quickly uncovered and processed at the time the expression is disseminated.  
Markets fail when information is hidden and unprocessed. The result is prices 
and behavior that do not account for the lost information. In this climate, 
externalities are likely to occur especially when choices are driven by short-term 
desire and emotion and economic interests that have the power to overwhelm 
the speech market are organized and determined to manipulate behavior. In 
order to minimize the spillover effect, the market needs to capture as much of the 
true cost of associating oneself with an idea as possible. Producers and 
supporters of an idea need to be clearly identified and consumers fully informed. 
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A marketplace rich in reliable information decreases the power of economic 
interests to manipulate and deceive and increases the ability of consumers to 
uncover the “tricks and traps” economic motivation fosters. Instead of drowning 
out expression from economically weak sources, government requirements that 
increase the amount of reliable information available to consumers work to 
inform and educate the public. By requiring full disclosure of the speakers’ and 
producers’ identities and creating a reliable information source that is 
prominently tied to the economically-driven expression, lost information is 
found and processed, public ignorance decreases and the need for paternalistic 
approaches to curb perceived market harms diminishes. In the end, self-
correcting long-term market outcomes are expedited, and regulatory regimes are 
structured around open market principles not speech bans. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has struggled over the last half century to find a place for economic 
expression among the theoretical landscape of the marketplace of ideas. This 
speech, which is provoked by monetary gains, is so closely tied to the 
undesirable outcomes of a self-regulated economic market that it has been 
difficult for the Court to bring it into the fold of fully protected speech. Instead, 
its attempts to fine tune the protection economic expression receives from the 
First Amendment have resulted in a patchwork of starts and stops that have 
produced a variety of disparate decisions. From upholding blanket bans that 
deprive the public of truthful nonmisleading commercial information to 
overturning precedent that restricted the rights of corporations to engage in 
political speech during an election, the Court’s attempts to build an optimal 
  
 
regulatory regime for economic expression have proven exceedingly difficult to 
attain and have garnered criticisms from commentators on nearly every side of 
the issues involved. 
 Behind many of the Court’s decisions in this area is a fear of economic 
power’s ability to corrupt and deceive – a fear no doubt fostered by the 
regulatory apparatus that has developed in the economic marketplace. 
Depression, recession, unemployment, inflation, stagnation and adverse 
externalities — the economic marketplace is ripe with examples of market 
failure, and yet the constitutional protection of one of the nation’s most valued 
liberties is based on the very concept that is often at the center of these failures. 
The idea that wiser, more useful and more desirable outcomes are generated by 
an unrestricted marketplace than one restricted by regulation forms the core of 
free speech and economic theory. Although both embrace a self-regulated 
marketplace, large segments of the economic marketplace remain heavily 
regulated, while the vast majority of the speech market is free from government 
intrusion. A regulatory dilemma develops, however, when the two intersect and 
economically based market fears stifle free speech values. In this environment, a 
link between economic expression and deceptive and corrupt economic practices 
is forged. Once the link is formed, even truthful nonmisleading economic 
expression is suspect and tied to wide-spread social harms. Everything from the 
word “casino” to prices for alcoholic beverages is ripe for restriction by way of a 
secondary effects justification, and the idea that a free expressive market will 
produce a better informed community of consumers is stifled. 
 In Citizens United, the Court retreated from this approach and severed the 
tie between corrupt economic practices and profit-driven speech. It fully 
  
 
embraced the free market concept where the public retains the right and the 
responsibility to “determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of 
consideration.”323 It embraced a market where speech is valued for the role it 
plays in the quest for effective self-government, and where the inclusion of 
voices and viewpoints are favored and suppression based on a speaker’s wealth, 
the amount of public support for an idea or the money used to disseminate it is 
prohibited.324 In the end, the Court narrowed the type of interest that could 
justify restriction of economic expression to quid pro quo corruption. In doing so, 
it fractured the association between corruption and favoritism and influence, and 
brought the periphery of First Amendment protection in line with the core 
principles of free speech theory.325 
Given the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United, there still may be hope for the 
commercial speech doctrine326 which suffers from the same often muddy 
association between real market harms, such as deceptive and fraudulent 
commercial advertising, and speculative harms, such as a fear of the persuasive 
power of truthful advertising for vice products. While the former warrants 
restrictions on expression, the latter does not. Like favoritism and influence, the 
potential adverse externalities associated with vice products are largely 
unlimited and unbounded and thus at odds with free speech values. A 
regulatory regime built on a boundless supply of speculative justifications to 
restrict expression in order to manipulate behavior not only infringes speech but 
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also creates a culture in which consumers become dependent on government to 
filter the information they can acquire in an effort to save them from themselves 
and their own rational irrationality. In such a regime, government assumes the 
responsibility for determining not only which behaviors are harmful or 
potentially harmful to society but also which information is likely to induce those 
behaviors and, therefore, is best kept from the minds of the public. The result is 
an uninformed and unaware public that is truly susceptible to deceptive 
economic expression and fraudulent sales practices.  
Because both economic and speech markets rely on perfect information for 
optimal performance, interests, be they government or corporate, that are able to 
control the information the marketplace distributes have a distinct advantage 
over consumers who do not possess the knowledge to make fully informed 
decisions or have the time necessary to investigate commercial claims. However, 
more information is not necessarily better information. More speech can add to 
the confusion, increase search costs and may, in the end, drive unwise 
purchasing or selection decisions and promote lifestyle choices that are harmful. 
Commentators have noted, for example, that disclosure of product attributes or 
potential product risks will not necessarily help consumers make wiser, more 
rational selection decisions.327 The time it takes to process the information can 
make the decision to ignore a disclosure a rational decision,328 especially if the 
information is technical in nature and difficult to absorb329 or the product market 
is crowded and the number of choices are overwhelming.330  Because no 
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individual possesses the “time or cognitive resources to be completely thorough 
and accurate with every decision,”331 acting on incomplete information or mental 
or emotional shortcuts is not necessarily irrational even if it can yield less than 
desirable results.332 While time and cognitive capabilities are important variables 
in the way people process and act upon information, responses to data are 
inseparable from a host of additional factors, including individual interests, 
desires, resources, strength of will and social circumstances and perspectives.333  
Given all the factors involved, “people may ignore information or 
misunderstand it or misuse it.”334 As a result, their decisions may be judged as 
wise or unwise and their choices determined to be the best means or the worst 
means available to achieve their goal. In the end and in the aggregate, they will 
respond to incentives. Disclosed information that is more valuable than 
expensive to use will be processed.335 And all information — disclosed or 
concealed — will have an effect on the overall market. The question then comes 
down to whether an open market structure works for economic expression. From 
a theoretical level, free speech theory — like economic theory — is largely 
concerned with the collective values an open marketplace will foster rather than 
the individual harms and unwise decisions that may occur as a result. Depriving 
citizens of information in order to influence consumer decisions and behavior 
runs counter to those values. Instead it is the inherent worth of speech in the 
marketplace that matters.  
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Because the true worth of speech is not always known or knowable, 
marketplace theory would have government error on the side of allowing more 
speech into the market — rather than less — noting that in the long run the 
inherent worth of speech will be realized. But consumers live in the short-run, 
where self-interests and adverse externalities may not be exposed in a timeframe 
necessary to prevent or curb widespread harm resulting from misinformation or 
misleading marketing tactics. As a result, many of the calls for restrictions on 
economic speech have focused on a fear of widespread corruption and 
deception. However removing information from the economic speech market not 
only frustrates the values an open marketplace promotes but also fosters public 
ignorance and diminishes self-reliance and the skills necessary for deliberation. 
Regulatory decisions that ban speech are more harmful to the traditional value of 
self-realization than an unfettered marketplace for economic expression. 
Therefore, restrictions that ban speech should be reserved as a means to combat 
deceptive and fraudulent speech activities. Instead, the link must be severed 
between deceptive practices and economic expressive power and its ability to 
overwhelm the speech market with incomplete information that has the potential 
to mislead consumers. The overall regulatory goal for the latter should focus on 
requirements that clearly disclose the identity of the speaker(s) and, thereby, 
alert the marketplace of the self-interests at play. Because optimal regulation is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, regulatory goals aimed at reducing hidden 
risks and performance flaws that create serious problems for the public at large 
should be focused on the disclosure of missing information.336 Disclosure 
requirements use a relatively light-handed government action to capture lost 
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information that can significantly improve practices or products and reduce 
serious widespread risks or performance flaws.337 The key is utility. Consumers 
are most “likely to act on new information only if it has value to them, is 
compatible with the way they make choices, and is easily comprehensible.”338 
New information must be easy to find, use and understand and must focus on 
the needs and interests of consumers when they are making routine purchasing 
and selection decisions.  In this way, disclosed information becomes an 
embedded part of a consumer’s decision-making process339 and a more accurate 
demand signal is sent to the economic interests involved. 
Regulations that enrich the supply of accurate, reliable and timely 
information that is available to consumers by exposing self-interests and 
widespread adverse externalities and hidden risks harness the self-correcting 
power of the marketplace to diminish the informational control economic 
interests exert over the marketplace, enhance self-reliance and participatory 
democracy, and lessen the need for paternalistic, content-restrictive regulations 
and deferential applications of First Amendment standards. In the end, the 
ability to achieve long-run outcomes in a short-run timeframe provides the 
framework needed to align economic expression with free speech theory and 
justifies a place at the constitutional table for profit-driven speech. 
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